MERCOSUR and the ACN in Comparative Perspective: Is There a Post-Westphalian Model in the South American Integration Processes?*

Gills Vilar Lopes

Abstract
Once South America is considered a relatively peaceful region, does it dispense with post-Westphalian mechanisms - such as the regional blocs - that inhibit conflicts in the region? In order to respond such problem, MERCOSUR and ACN are selected because of its political, military, interstate relations produce certain identifiable patterns over space and time. In terms of methodology, it's qualitatively adopted the Emil Kirchner and James Sperling' models of state structures, which one are directed to overcome the problems of regional security governance. It is alto selected Olivier Dabène’s comparative method on South American blocs, as a political and historical contribution, as well as the Oscar Medeiros Filho’s geopolitical view about this region. It is concluded that the MERCOSUR can be considered a “Westphalian regional bloc,” and that the ACN, although has post-Westphalian model features, also carries other Westphalian that exceed those.

Keywords: International Relations, South America, International Security, Strategic Studies, Defense.

Resumo
Tendo em vista que a América do Sul é considerada uma região relativamente pacífica, ela dispensaria mecanismos pós-vestfalianos — tais como os blocos regionais — inibidores de conflitos na região? Para responder a tal problema, escolhem-se o MERCOSUL e a CAN devido a suas relações políticas, militares e interestatais, que produzem certos padrões identificáveis no tempo e no espaço. Em termos de metodologia, adotou-se qualitativamente o modelo de estruturas estatais, de Emil Kirchner e James Sperling, o qual é direcionado para a superação dos problemas de governança de segurança regional. Selecciona-se também o método comparativo de Olivier Dabène sobre blocos regionais sul-americanos, bem como o a visão geopolítica de Oscar Medeiros Filhos sobre a região. Conclui-se que o MERCOSUL pode ser considerado um "bloco regional vestfaliano" e que a CAN, embora tenha características do modelo pós-vestfaliano, também traz outras características vestfalianas que os excede em muito.


1 Introduction

South America adopts two main Manichean bias when studying security and defense. The first one is related to interstate threats, whose region is predominantly considered to be one of few international conflicts (MEDEIROS FILHO, 2010, p. 12) as well as relatively pacific (BRAZIL, 2012), even though – as highlighted by Mares (2008, p. 2-11), Alsina Júnior (2008, p. 241), Barry Buzan e Ole Wæver (2003, p. 304-339) – latent historic disputes still subsist, such as pending territorial issues regarding the Falklands, Essequibo, amongst others. The second bias refers to a deeper inner core, the countries of this region find extremely difficult to tackle the so-called “asymmetric threats” - such as drug trafficking and bio-piracy. Thus, the most logical action is to encourage inter-block cooperation through post-Westphalian mechanisms in order to inhibit conflict development. Although apparently, that is not what the region shows.

Such dichotomy creates at least three dilemmas to these countries: (i) the modernization of the armed forces in light of the asymmetric threats (COVARRUBIAS, 1999, p. 3), which leads to an ontological division between public security and national defense – a fact much feared by scholars on matters of defense (ASSOCIAÇÃO..., [201-]); (ii) the prioritization of a consolidated democracy - at both national and regional levels –, wherein the proper attention to national defense does not occur, especially in times of (overall) peace; and (iii) the promotion of the cooperation in matters of regional security, amidst diverse national security cultures.

Therefore, in considering (a) the possibilities of complex inferences and (b) the defense matters as a intervenient variable, it is possible to ponder that the South American scenario is rather relevant to such analytical work and this challenge is what motivated this study. More specifically, the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the Andean Community of Nations (ACN) have been selected due to the fact that the political and military relations between its member States result in certain identifiable prototypes through time and space, which allows their categorization in a given behavioral pattern.

Models of government structures engendered by Emil Kirchner and James Sperling were chosen as an analysis framework. These models are oriented to overcome the problems of regional security and global governance. The former is the object of this chapter, where countries are analyzed with regards to its categorical adaptations between Westphalian and post-Westphalian, which are further analyzed in the next chapter. In order to attain the objectives proposed, it is believed that a foreign model has neither analytical efficacy nor academic pragmatism, given that it is oblivious to the South American idiosyncrasies, and particularly the two regional blocks on screen (refer, for instance, to professor Héctor Luis Saint Pierre’s critics in the last pages). For this reason, the following were selected: the comparative perspective of Olivier Dabène on Latin American regional blocks, for historical and political contribution; and the geopolitical examination of this region by Oscar Medeiros Filho.

The choice for the post-Westphalia model to figure in the subtitle of this paper is explained by the fact that (i) much of the literature about the processes of Latin American regional integration (RIP) assign to that region a non-pessimistic conduction of multilateral cooperation through
regional block – specially in the MERCOSUR, and (ii) it is a rather peaceful subcontinent (DABÊNE, 2009, p. 7). The hypothesis to be tested in this study aims to answer if such understanding – based, thus, on a post-Westphalia model – is applicable to the South American region, in spite of the role of the MERCOSUR and ACN.

2 The Westphalian and Post-Westphalian Models

Kirchner and Sperling (2010, xvi-xviii) propose a framework that aims to explain how the culture of national security impacts in the regional security governance. For this purpose, they use four intervening variables to know how the State: (i) understands the external environment; (ii) uses its diplomatic tools: if coercively or persuasively; (iii) expresses its pattern of interaction: if unilateral, bilateral or multilateral; and (iv) makes institutional choices. In this line of reasoning, the issue of security governance is analyzed under four areas or categories: (a) prevention: pre-conflict interventions; (b) assurance: post-conflict interventions; (c) protection: internal security; and (d) compellence: military intervention (SPERLING, 2010, p.1).

Depending on how the culture of national security of a given country is driven, and taking into account the variables and the above categories, it is possible, according to Kirchner and Sperling, to frame it in a Westphalian and post-Westphalian model. This study extrapolates the original scope proposed by such a model on the assumption that national security cultures may reflect the formation or not of a regional culture, even minimally institutionalized, if analyzed together and if their boundaries and history are respected.

Roughly speaking, the core of Kirchner and Sperling’s analysis tool regress to concepts engendered from the so-called “Peace of Westphalia” a set of international treaties signed in 1648 ending various European wars, creating an international system – European – of nation states. In other words, after 1648, only a few countries – at that time, dynastic monarchies – which had very similar war wingspans (principle of “power balance”) become the main international actors capable of destabilizing the international order (KISSINGER, 1994, p. 21). One of the key points in this context is the notion that war, from that moment on, becomes a legitimate instrument no longer in the name of God and /or the Pope, but in their own aspirations and country’s actions (Raison d’État). Hence, today, the “[…] persistence of the Westphalian state elsewhere better explains the continuing force of anarchy and the persistence of the balance of power, concerts and impermanent alliances as regulators of interstate conflict” (SPERLING, 2010, p. 2).

It is also worth noting that this attempt to categorize the State based on the features behind the engineered system from 1648 is also adopted by other authors. Buzan and Wæver, for instance, mold three ideal types that aim to designate the State spectrum between weak and strong, namely: pre-modern, modern and post-modern (BUZAN; WÆVER, 2003, p. 22). Besides, this is also the engineering behind the concept of regional security complexes (RSC) of the Copenhagen School. Although the RSC are more detailed in the works of Buzan and Wæver (2003, p. 60-89) and of Medeiros Filho (2010, p. 52-58), it’s worth emphasizing that its typologies (conflict formation, security regime and security community) allow a correlation to be made between Westphalian
and post-Westphalian models in regards to a greater or minor propensity to conflict by South American countries. To Buzan and Wæver, the regional security sub-complexes of the Southern Cone and of the Andes occupy different positions with regards to propensity to conflict, *i.e.* there are distinct conflict resolution and cooperation policies/institutions/cultures (BUZAN; WÆVER, 2003, p. 340). According to them, the Southern Cone is a sub-region that is transmigrating from a security regime to a security community. In the Andean region of South America, the combat of narcotrafficking – with the aid from the United States of America (USA), maintain alive the latent and traditional question regarding border security (FRANÇA, 2011, p. 71) by inserting the ACN countries in the “conflict formation” typology, *i.e.* they are more inclined towards conflict (BUZAN; WÆVER, 2003, p. 340). The latter Copenhagen typology also seems to be more prone to Westphalian-typed countries.

Thus, according to Sperling, Westphalian States have the following characteristics: are indisposed to cooperating and to security governance; have a strong sense of belonging to the territory; are highly preoccupied with protecting its autonomy and independence; and separate domestic from foreign politics. Following this same line of reasoning, Buzan and Wæver remind that until little after the Second World War, these were the characteristics of modern States that predominated in the international relations: truly robust and centralizing governments who looked to control their societies; independent and auto-sufficient attitude; untouchable sovereignty; geographical boundaries that visibly delimited their cultures, economy and policies; strong tendency towards securitize in threats that are inside/outside its territories (BUZAN; WÆVER, 2003, p. 22-23).

Therefore, in comparative terms, the modern model of State used by these two authors resembles the Westphalian under study.

The post-Westphalian model, on the other hand, seems to move towards a more neoliberal institutionalist view of the international relations. In this model, the State adopts three main characteristics that differ from that of the Westphalian: (i) reduction in its capacity and desire to be the portal between internal and external flows of people, goods and ideas; (ii) voluntary acceptance of the interstate governance and of the lack of autonomy, in order to maximize the benefits of welfare of these cross-border flows and to meet the challenges and common threats to national welfare; and (iii) the international law qualifies both the sovereignty of a government, by legitimizing or not its prerogatives against its own people, as that of the international or supranational bodies (SPERLING, 2010, p. 2-3).

As previously seen, this post-Westphalian hypothesis denies the main assumptions of (Neo)Realist theory of International Relations (RI), especially those who discourse in favor of a single and homogeneous international society comprised of unitary States – the Waltzian “billiard balls”. Hence, specifically under this point of view, Sperling seems to adopt a rather consistent line of reasoning of that of other authors, like Hurrell (2007, p. 3-4), who, in a similar effort, seeks to identify the first analytical framework with which to deliberate about the international order through the idea of a pluralist and limited society of sovereign States. Just as Sperling, Hurrel – a successor of the tradition of the English School of International Relations – uses a certain number of central institutions to compose his framework, namely: the international law, the power balance, the great powers, the diplomacy and, it could not have been any different, the war. In contrast, similarly to Hurrel, Sperling targets a great deal of his analysis to the indispensable role
of the civil society as a variable to be considered by policy makers. In this sense, outputs initiated within the State, with the help of the physical barrier dilution and revolution set forth by information technologies and communication (TIC), can take gigantic proportions in another – especially if this a State of the Post-Westphalian model. Thus, it is more probable that Post-Westphalian States are more willing to substitute their particular goals on national security matters for wider and more collective goals – as is the case of the European Union (SPERLING, 2010, p. 4). The post-Westphalian model also corroborates with the post-modern model of Buzan and Wæver, especially with regards to the voluntary cession of its borders, thus, leaning towards greater multilateral cooperation in order to overcome the challenges emerged from it.

3 MERCOSUR AND ACN in Comparative Perspective: Is There a Post-Westphalian Model in the Regional Integration Processes (RIP) of South America?

The French Olivier Dabène define RIP as a historical process of increasing levels of interaction between political units – sub-national, national or transnational – marked by actors who share common ideas, set goals and define orchestrated means to reaching them; and that, once attained, help to build a region (DABÈNE, 2009, p. 10). From this assertion derive three corollaries: (i) the process can include a diversity of actors, levels and agendas; (ii) the process can derive from something strategically planned or may arise from an unintentional social interaction; and (iii) the process can create formal institutions to sustain it. All three derivations are taken into consideration in this analysis, since: (I) the perception of actors (public in general and military specifically) and the materialization of the agendas (of national security) of the South American RIP are indispensable to trace a comparative panorama of the MERCOSUR and of the ACN; (ii) the modus operandi from which the RIP in question resulted help to identify their main turning points; and (iii) the formalization of these two RIP, per se, can indicate certain behavior by the armed forces or related to the national security matter.

Under the debate on supra, this section of the text is devoted to a closer examination of the two selected objects for analysis: the ACN and MERCOSUR. There is no intention in bringing legal frameworks or deeper data on both, but in demonstrating the reason behind the choice, through the opportunities and challenges for national and regional security issues they cover.

The sub-regional integration process of the Andes is one of the oldest of Latin America, which dates back to the first meetings in the mid 1960’s in the core of what is known as the first wave of regionalization. Upon the military interventions of some member States of the Andean Pact – like Peru and Chile – in the 1970’s, this RIP enters in abandonment, given that the barracks at the time prefer to turn to national affairs, and especially not to engage in sharing collective or supranational concerns (it is interesting to note that, from the point of view of the history of south-American politics and of the Cold War conjecture, the main operational representatives of the area of defense – the military – do not even consider the usage of the Andean RIP to foment cultures of sub-regional security; on the contrary, they turn ever more to their own concerns).
In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, taking into account (i) the re-democratization of the subcontinent and (ii) the need to oppose to the Initiative for the Americas – biased by the Bush (father) government which had a strong economic focus, the new national leaderships seek to regain control of the Andean RIP (DABÈNE, 2009, p. 92). However, the Andean Pact becomes the Andean Community only in 1996. As reminded by Dabène, the ACN possesses an institutional contribution rather complete and numerous. Currently it is comprised of the following member States: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru (COMUNIDAD..., [201-]). Chile dismembers from the ACN in 1977 as a result of what has been previously mentioned and Venezuela retracts in 2000, in retaliation to the agreement signed between USA, Colombia and Peru, therefore looking to gain in MERCOSUR a new regional support (DABÈNE, 2009, p. 211). Hence, Dabène agrees with the hypothesis of McCall Smith relatively to the fact that the more encouraged its members are to deepen the RIP, the more legalized the process is (DABÈNE, 2009, p. 87). In this sense, we can see that the ACN’s legal support is one of the strongest within the regional blocs of the entire American continent and the strongest in South America in particular, although it can not provide itself an institutionalized apparatus with supranational powers (DABÈNE, 2009, p. 93). In other words, the administrative logic of ACN seems to follow a Westphalian model of governance, although there are well advanced regional initiatives for social development and cooperative programs in healthcare – typical of post-Westphalian States.

The agreements that formalize MERCOSUR are one of those which inaugurate the second wave of regional integration in the early 1990s. This period, as reminded by Dabène, is also notoriously marked by civil movements against globalization, despite unpopular acceptance of the so-called Washington Consensus, a series of macroeconomic policies of neoliberal character by the "Bretton Woods Institutions" (World Bank and International Monetary Fund). The two "founding fathers" of MERCOSUR sought a RIP that were totally different from the Andean, with regard to the administrative inflexibility, i.e., with few institutions – the institutional modesty spoken by Dabène – and a basic bureaucracy. It can be said that MERCOSUR’s institutional arrangements favor Brazil: it has a possibility of enviable core within the block, possessing enough power to overcome almost any vote, thus, increasing the asymmetry in the Southern Cone. Dabène points out that the low level of legalism linked to the intergovernmental approach prevails (there is a stronger linkage to a realistic aspect than a liberal one) to the detriment of a supranational, where the key decisions are taken by consensus between the Presidents of the respective States members. This kind of institutional architecture makes "integration from below" an unattainable task – that is, that decision-making processes start from the society and up to the government official – so that there is some loss of credibility by regional policy makers, accentuating ever more the known "integration from above"(DABÈNE, 2009, p. 96-98). In view of (i) the temporary detachment of Paraguay due to the impeachment of former President Fernando Lugo, in June 2012, and (ii) the subsequent acceptance of the application for membership of Venezuela to the bloc as a member-Plenum(DABÈNE, 2009, p. 96-98), major inferences are not made as to the Bolivarian State within a block because their aspirations and actions were not fully backed by the MERCOSUR’s guidelines. The pacifist tradition of Brazilian foreign policy (PEB) (LA BER, 2004, passim) virtually sets the tone of the perceptions of government threats to the block in the pre stage Venezuela.
As for defense matters under the two regional blocks now in question, there hardly exist forums or policies that generate or facilitate regional security culture or even to promote prevention or ex-ante analysis in this area; what are seen, in fact, are the documents related to ex-post specific problems, but which often do not pass through the sieve and / or military counsel, but through the political and / or administrative field. Perhaps a criticism that can be made to this assertion comes from the data made available by Dabène about the decisions taken by the two blocks: of its 707 decisions taken between 1969-2008, the ACN has allocated 34% of them to the policy area (institutions, foreign affairs, human rights and security), and 45% to trade; as for MERCOSUR, of its 526 decisions between 1991 and 2007, half of them were for the policy area (idem) (DABÈNE, 2009, p. 122-127).

Nevertheless, if one looks closely to the numbers it is possible to perceive that in the case of MERCOSUR, for instance, the decisions strictly related to security issues – which can include defense issues – add up to only 16, that is 3% of the total(DABÈNE, 2009, p. 126); In the case of ACN it is even more confusing, as “security” is a subcategory in of the wide area of “politics”, however, on the other hand, there is another subcategory in “social” that entails “anti-drug policy” (less than 5% of the general total)(DABÈNE, 2009, p. 123). Even when seeking to separate matters of defense from those of security, specifically to the Andean region, not only this separation does not exist as it is embedded in the national security culture of countries such as Colombia. This reflects two facts: the first is related to the precision of the information obtained in the source, in the sense that the subcategories should be better detailed quantitatively; and the second is the negligence applied to issues of national/regional security in both the organizations in analysis. As well remembered by the professor of International Relations of the Federal University of Sergipe (UFS), Tereza Cristina França: “The characteristics of the conflicts are linked to the societies”, thus “the range of the conflict can grow or remain static, can move out of a State or it can also penetrate it”(FRANÇA, 2011, p. 70). Based on this logic, the conflicts can be analyzed/categorized in accordance to the following operation range: local-national-international-transnational-global.

Scheme 1 demonstrates what the professor proposed. Recalling the attention to ACN, it is an area with a history of conflicts whose operation range vary from local to transnational and it is not by chance that Dabène himself acknowledges that “security is a complex issue” in that region(DABÈNE, 2009, p. 185).
The analysis now turns to a specific analysis on the South American geopolitics, taking the arguments of the professor in International Relations and Geography at the Brazilian Military Academy of Agulhas Negras (AMAN), Oscar Medeiros Filho, as input. This section aims to highlight (i) the different national security cultures that Member States of MERCOSUR and the ACN have and (ii) the absence of regional security culture – or its institutional equivalent – by MERCOSUR and ACN. This thesis seeks support especially with regards to (a) the multiple nature of the actors that threaten the sovereignty of the countries concerned, (b) the operation range of South American conflicts and (c) the pending historical territorial disputes among some of its member States for which already resulted in more sensitive conflicts. It is understood, therefore, that only through the geopolitics of the region and the conflict analysis would it be possible to achieve success in obtaining an answer to corroborate or not the main question raised by this research.

The first understanding about the conflict is its political output characteristic, which is well documented in the methodology applied by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) on intra and inter-state conflicts. According to HIIK, the political conflict arises from the positional difference in relation to relevant values of a given society – conflict items –
between a minimum of two forceful and directly involved actors. Such difference emerge from observable and interconnected conflict measures that permeates regulations, thus, threatening or prospecting to threaten core State functions and the international order (HEIDELBERG…, 2012). In that sense, five levels of intensity can be assessed from the above mentioned definition: latent conflict, manifest conflict, crises, severe crises and war (the HIIK has modified the categories in the last few years in order to mold it to their methodologies). Map 1 shows the incidence of violent conflicts worldwide in 2011, whose color variation corresponds to the intensity of the conflict: the darker the color, the higher the intensity.

Map 1 – Violent conflicts at a national level in 2011, according to Heidelberg… (2012, adapted)


From map 1 it is possible to note that a great part of the South Cone does not show violent conflicts, whilst the Andean regions shows a darker color. Hence, according to HIIK, the table below shows the most important conflicts in 2011 in South America involving member States of both regional blocks herein analyzed.
Table 1. Interstate Conflicts in South America (2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member States</th>
<th>Conflict Items</th>
<th>Intensity</th>
<th>Block(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina and United Kingdom</td>
<td>Territory and resources (Falklands)</td>
<td>1 (latent conflict)</td>
<td>MERCOSUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia and Chile</td>
<td>Territory and resources (sea access)</td>
<td>1 (latent conflict)</td>
<td>ACN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia and Ecuador</td>
<td>International Power</td>
<td>1 (latent conflict)</td>
<td>ACN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia and Venezuela**</td>
<td>Ideology and international power</td>
<td>1 (latent conflict)</td>
<td>ACN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia and Nicaragua</td>
<td>Territory and resources (maritime border)</td>
<td>1 (latent conflict)</td>
<td>ACN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru and Chile</td>
<td>Territory and resources (borders)</td>
<td>1 (latent conflict)</td>
<td>ACN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela ** and USA</td>
<td>Ideology and International Power</td>
<td>2 (manifest conflict)</td>
<td>ACN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela ** and Colombia</td>
<td>Territory and resources (Archipelago of Los Monjes)</td>
<td>1 (latent conflict)</td>
<td>ACN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: HIIK, Conflict Barometer, 52-53 (adapted).

Notes: * As reminded by França (2011, p. 74), throughout other years, the Falkland War occupied all levels of intensity.
** Although Venezuela had retracted from ACN in 2006, it is still in the list on the block, given that its ideological and territorial turmoil with Colombia begin respectively in 2004 and 1871, and with the USA in 2001.

As evidenced, seven out of eight conflicts in 2011 have the participation of at least one member State from the ACN and only one has at least one member-Plenum from MERCOSUR involved. It is worth emphasizing that the violent conflicts of higher intensities (from 3 to 5, in the scale set forth by HIIK) were not in the table, since they had been analyzed only at a sub-national level, that is, with fulcrum in episodes whose conflict items revolve around issues mainly related to drug trafficking and internal movements, such as secession and the agrarian reform. If they had been added to Table 1, the ACN would have had many more citations, above all because of the prolonged conflict between Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The data shown above confirm the "theory of the arcs" (better explained next) of the professor of International Relations from the State University Paulista Julio de Mesquita Filho (UNESP), Héctor Saint-Pierre.
Medeiros Filho notes that the RIP – those shown with higher frequency in the agendas of post-Westphalian States – give a new face to South American geopolitics, especially to the extreme north (Andes) and south (South Cone) of that region. In his point of view, this type of policy is a clear overcoming of the classic realist paradigm – frequent in Westphalian models – in the subcontinent. The role of RIP towards the geopolitics of South America is configured as an independent variable, whose manipulation can explain how policy and national security cultures take shape, both in the Southern Cone representative (MERCOSUR), as in the Andes (ACN). As an aid to his analytical endeavor, he resorts to a typology created by Saint-Pierre, in which he divided the subcontinent into two regions, thus forming two streak-shaped arcs: the "Arc of Stability" and "Arc of Instability" (MEDEIROS FILHO, 2010, p. 65). These two types match, precisely with the above analysis (as mentioned earlier): the first arc permeates all MERCOSUR’s countries without areas of potential armed conflict; and the second arc defines the areas – the Amazon and Andes – where conflict is more likely to occur.

Map 2 – Arcs of "stability" and of “instability” in South America
Map 2 can be interpreted in many ways. One of these ways is the graphic culmination of interstate conflict history, especially among the countries of the Andean region. It seems that the States of that region searched for many decades for a way to solve the conflicts through the use of force. The hemispheric mechanisms are shown to be practically ineffective, especially when the intensity of the conflict reaches higher rates. The chief example of this is taken from the Falklands War in 1982, when the Organization of American States (OAS | OEA) did nothing and the South American territory was the stage for the landing of extra-continental troops.

The final analysis of Medeiros Filho about the levels of “geopolitical integration” in South America is that which “seems to obey an increasing gradation line between the Atlantic slope (greater level of integration / stability) and the Pacific slope (compromised integration and regional instability) (MEDEIROS FILHO, 2010, p. 65). Thus, according to his reasoning, it is possible to conclude that what he calls a South American "geopolitical integration" is nothing more than the finding that the sub-regional blocks can’t overcome the interstate conflicts between members in a strategic and abridged manner. An example of that is the war between Peru and Ecuador in 1995, when it practically balks the Andean RIP (DABÈNE, 2009, p. 93). Table 2 summarizes the main arguments from the authors mentioned in this section on the conflicting aspects between ACN and MERCOSUR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHOR(S) / ARGUMENTS</th>
<th>MERCOSUR</th>
<th>ACN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barry Buzan e Ole Wæver / Typology of the RSC</td>
<td>Between regime and security community</td>
<td>Conflict formation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tereza Cristina França / Conflict range</td>
<td>Local-national-international-transnational</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oscar Medeiros Filho / Level of “geopolitical integration”</td>
<td>Greater level of integration/stability</td>
<td>Compromised integration and regional instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Héctor Saint-Pierre / Topology with respect to conflict propensity</td>
<td>Stability Arc</td>
<td>Instability Arc</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own compilation.

Ultimately, countries often enter into conflict due to lack of communication between themselves or minimally institutionalized means that solidify mutual trust – first step in the unfolding of a regional security culture. This seems to be the case both for MERCOSUR as for ACN.

From this perspective, there is no regional security governance (in this case, sub-regional and attached to a RIP), as proposed by Kirchner and Sperling, precisely because there is also no significant theoretical and/or empirical support on four areas of such governance (listed in the primary section of the paper). On the other hand, there are two reasons that can guide the
comprehension of such void. The first of them relates to initial and current powers of the two RIP discussed here. MERCOSUR, for example, was devised to be like its own nomenclature suggests, a common market, that is, a zone of primarily economic privileges among its members, although today it constitutes an imperfect customs union (KUME; PIANI, 2005). ACN, in turn, selects the social concerns as your home flag; a proof of this is the creation of the active Andean Health Organization (ORAS)( DABÈNE, 2009, p. 181). But behind these justifications lie two other counter-arguments for each of the two blocks, for which the issue of defense is a liaison. The first is on MERCOSUR and the certification of what the neo-functionalist Ernst B. Haas coined as spill-over; and the second is on ACN, dating back to the aforementioned concept of RIP, provided by Dabène.

Before engaging on the idea engendered by Haas, it is important to safeguard (which is linked to a warning made by Saint-Pierre) the use of concepts and other explanatory mechanisms developed specifically for the process of European integration, which due to its effectiveness with explanation and inference, is also widely used by the national literature to make comparisons between RIP:

To pretend to import the successful European case to South America could result in a comedy. It is an academic obligation to study that process, however, if one turns it into a paradigm, that reflects the unawareness of the severity of the history throughout time and space. Although (i) Europeans were not yet able to reach the point of desired integration, and (ii) differences on domestic commercial and economic interests become apparent each time they have to deliberate over a foreign conflict, it is their economical and political integration process that may someday allow the EU to follow a common security and defense policy. [translated by author] (SAINT-PIERRE, 2009, p. 18).

Having the above warning in mind, the discussion on the concept of spill-over – whose unborn child is the post-World War II period and whose defense is linked to the view that in order to provide security and development to Europe (torn at the time) it was imperative for an integration between their States to occur – can be continued. The way in which such integration would be embraced is a major point of discussion between integrationist politicians and academics of that time. Hass is among those who support a deep and gradual European RIP and justify it on the assumption that (i) regional integration in the continent was inevitable and that such should be left to supranational bodies who would centralize decisions on strategic sectors – such as the production of coal and steel, raw materials that fueled the war industry of World War II – for the maintenance of European peace, and (ii) the integration in an industry would necessarily lead to technical pressures in other sectors. It is in the latter that rests the idea of a spill-over effect – in the national literature on RIP, the term is kept intact in its mother language (English); in other cases, it is usually translated as "overflow" or "contamination". In the words of Marcelo de Almeida Medeiros – Professor on Political Science at the Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE) – “this mechanism constitutes the saliens punctum of neo-functionalism,
which inspired by the functionalism, prescribes a method of cooperation that is not coercive” (MEDEIROS, 2010, p. 284, free translation). The primary concerns of the Brazilian and Argentine governments can be attributed to such a tool.

By the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, in the absence of communication channels and mutual cooperation of institutions between the two countries, their nuclear projects would arise in both the defensive-offensive aspirations originated by the security dilemma. The worsening of their relations, still under the shadow of the “Iron Curtain”, their Presidents sought to strengthen mutual confidence by electing the economic sector as one that would cement the first layer in the RIP of the Southern Cone. The idea that national security sector pressures caused economic output can be a variation of the effect formulated by Haas. Medeiros’s concepts on the original meaning of the spill-over, still asserts that such a mechanism is “a vector of further pollution [...] that debuts in a specific industry, and gradually spreads to adjacent and interdependent sectors”, thus favoring "the development and consolidation of supra-nationality" (MEDEIROS, 2010, p. 284). As aforementioned, MERCOSUR does not follow the supranational logic, but the intergovernmental one, which may explain – to some extent – the fact that national security issues had not been "contaminated" by the economic sector, since in the intergovernmental approach the State members of a regional or international body do not abdicate part of their sovereignty – supranational principle – due to the fear of losing power. Therefore, a regional security culture remained only in pre-MERCOSUR’s ideas, pinpointed as an “imperfect spill-over effect” given that the initial objectives have been achieved (trust and mutual cooperation between the two countries, ruling out any kind of enmity). However, it did not result in the original and informal overflow / contamination (regional security), but remained in the first sector (economy), by moving to other sectors in varying degrees (such as culture and education).

The second counter-argument is that original ideas (formally signed) for the creation of both regional blocks are not concerned with national security is attributed to ACN. It is doubly linked to the concept of regional integration formulated by Dabène, and also to the environment in which the Andean Pact functions. As Dabène mentioned, RIP is a historical process. In other words, it is necessarily a dynamic process that must adapt or respond alone to nationally or internationally imposed constraints in order to overcome it in a well-articulated manner. Now, even though the process of regional integration has not been conceptualized under the tutelage of one of the superpowers at the time – the USA and the Soviet Union – it is important not lose sight of (i) the fact that the American continent was actually a direct zone of influence from the Yankees, (ii) the fact that Cuba – greatest exponent of American political and strategic renouncement in the Americas – is a few miles away from Colombia, for example. Even though the initial aspirations have turned to the social aspect of the member States, it was soon after Augusto Pinochet went to power in Chile a few years after the signing of the Pact – on the grounds that the Andean country was heading for a socialism of the communist type –, that the logic of national security impeded any regional aspiration. A realist bias based on the fact that international affairs should be managed strictly in terms of high politics is not what is supported here; however, to neglect it completely can be a vital error depending on the surrounding environment.


Table 3 – MERCOSUR AND ACN in comparative perspective

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>MERCOSUR</th>
<th>ACN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intra-block power asymmetry</td>
<td>Medium/high</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legalism</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional complexity</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agenda amplitude</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of integration/ civil society involvement</td>
<td>“from above” / low</td>
<td>“from above” / low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Governance</td>
<td>Inter governmentalism (realist)</td>
<td>Inter governmentalism (liberal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional security culture</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own compilation.

Because this study is not within the normative scope but rather the investigative one, it is unnecessary to make any kind of recommendations, given that most of them would be towards what the Council of South American Defense (CSD | CDS) - under the auspices of the Union of South American Nations (USAN | UNASUL) - is already unfolding: the closing of all loopholes by acting on the sensitive and complex area of sub-regional security. The CSD is not arranged in the same manner as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is a military alliance. It can not even be embedded in the much desired European Defense Community, rejected in 1954; it can, however, be considered a response to the lack of initiatives on the part of the South American RIP on defense and regional security. It’s in its consonance that Saint-Pierre (2009, p. 18) asserts the importance of CSD, decreeing the failure of other international bodies in the Americas.

4 Conclusion

In accordance to what was briefly mentioned in this study so far, it appears that at least in the last quarter, the history and politics show that there is a significant link between RIP and peace-building (Dabène, 2009, p. 7). Unlike the European Union, whose leitmotiv to promote their integration was security and who were still under the debris left by the Second World War, South America seems to wander and defend various causes in favor of their RIP. The latter does not represent failure a priori, but can mean that there is an institutional immobilization a posteriori, as already explained in the third section of the text.

This study goes beyond the application of the concepts formulated by Kirchner and Sperling as its aim is to understand whether or not there exists regional security cultures in MERCOSUR and ACN. However, this study did not find significant subsidies to affirm the existence of a purely post-Westphalian model in the processes of South American regional integration, even though
processes aiming to overcome on some level certain challenges posed by the Westphalian model are shown. Furthermore, out the two blocks, MERCOSUR can be considered as a "Westphalian regional block" and the ACN, although it has some typical credentials of the post-Westphalian model, it also has others of Westphalian nature – identified in Tables 2 and 3 – which far outweigh the former.

Certainly, the creation of the CSD arises to fill most of the voids that MERCOSUR and ACN have left regarding cooperation on defense issues with essential elements that would accredit both RIP as post-Westphalian on matters of regional security culture.

References


